Runyon v. McCrary Should Not Be Overruled by Frankel, Marvin E.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 67 
Issue 1 Symposium on the Reconsideration of Runyon v. McCrary 
1989 
Runyon v. McCrary Should Not Be Overruled 
Marvin E. Frankel 
Kramer, Levin, Nessen, Kamin & Frankel 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Marvin E. Frankel, Runyon v. McCrary Should Not Be Overruled, 67 WASH. U. L. Q. 1 (1989). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss1/2 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
Washington University
Law Quarterly
VOLUME 67 NUMBER 1 1989
RUNYON v. McCRAR Y SHOULD NOT
BE OVERRULED
MARVIN E. FRANKEL*
There is scarcely anyone in the legal profession for whom it is seemly
or necessary to speak of an opinion by a Justice of the Supreme Court as
"clearly" or "patently" or "obviously" wrong. The only exceptions that
come swiftly to mind are editors of law journals or other Justices of the
Supreme Court, -and it is not obvious that these are exceptions we should
necessarily cherish.
Apart from the proprieties-and granting that not everyone appointed
to our highest Court has been the peer of Hand or Friendly-one is dis-
posed to imagine that a seven to two decision of the Supreme Court is
likely to have at least some plausible grounds to support it. Indeed, this
is true even though imagination is not strained by supposing prima facie
that the two dissenters probably had something arguable to say for their
divergent views. I approach my topic from this point of view. I shall be
arguing that in all the pertinent circumstances, Runyon v. McCraryI
should not be overruled unless it was grossly, utterly, and destructively
wrong. Obviously, I believe no such demonstration is possible.
To suggest the full measure of my partisanship, I should also mention
that my name appears as counsel of record on the brief for 112 organiza-
tions-ranging from the American Jewish Congress through the Ameri-
can-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee to the YWCA of the U.S.A.-
* Partner, Kramer, Levin, Nessen, Kamin & Frankel, New York, New York. Formerly Pro-
fessor of Law, Columbia Law School and U.S. District Judge, Southern District of New York.
1. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
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urging as amici curiae in the pending case of Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union 2 that Runyon not be overruled. (Much of this paper summarizes,
and some even copies, passages from that brief.)
These initial statements also further define the topic of this paper. In
some measure, the reference to the seven to two vote in Runyon (corre-
sponding to the score in Runyon's predecessor Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co. 3) is, in itself, part of the argument for following the principle of stare
decisis. In simplest terms, this paper posits the question whether a com-
manding majority could have been so wrong twenty years ago, and again
twelve years ago, that, with no intervening changes of law or learning,
the precedents should be discarded. Having said that much, I add two
more introductory thoughts: First, I have argued elsewhere and would
submit that Jones and Runyon were correct and would be sound today if
decided the same way as an original problem. I will omit here the argu-
ments of statutory language and history supporting that view, acknowl-
edging again that the likes of Justices Harlan, White and Rehnquist
might have had arguable reasons for a different view. Second, assuming
for present purposes that the prior cases could have gone either way, I
will concentrate on what I think are compelling reasons for adhering to
precedent in this instance.
I.
The pending case of Patterson v. McLean Credit Union involves a black
employee's claim of racially-motivated harassment and denial of a pro-
motion because of her race.4 The question of interest that has led to the
Supreme Court's order for reargument is whether this claim is cognizable
under 42 U.S.C. section 1981, which provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties,
taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.5
More specifically, the question the Court ordered the parties to address
2. No. 87-107 (U.S. argued Oct. 12, 1988).
3. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
4. 805 F.2d 1143, 1145 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 65 (1987), argued, No. 87-107
(U.S. Oct. 12, 1988).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
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on reargument is "Whether or not the interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981
adopted by this Court in Runyon v. McCrary should be reconsidered?" 6
This question, in turn, is a reminder to recall that Runyon answered af-
firmatively the question whether "42 U.S.C. § 1981 ... prohibits private
schools from excluding qualified children solely because they are
Negroes." 7
Pursuing this regress further, the Runyon decision rested upon a fairly
clear line of precedent extending back to Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.8
which had held that 42 U.S.C. section 1982 forbids racially discrimina-
tory refusals to contract for the sale of real property. 9 Writing a concur-
rence in Runyon, Justice Powell said he "might well be inclined" to vote
the other way "[i]f the slate were clean .... ." Justice Stevens described
a comparable disposition more strongly: "For me the problem ... is
whether to follow a line of authority which I firmly believe to have been
incorrectly decided."'" His concurrence, then, assigns signally powerful
weight to the claims of stare decisis. Justice Stevens has reaffirmed this
position with intensity in dissenting from the "reconsideration" of Run-
yon that is about to be undertaken in Patterson.12
II.
The dissent from the order for reargument in Patterson is a kind of
threshold event that is intellectually important as well as dramatic. Why
should the Court divide five to four over whether there should be a "re-
consideration" of a prior decision? Do the dissenters fear that a favored
result is so poorly grounded that it cannot survive renewed scrutiny?
Are any decisions at once so revered and so fragile that they must be
immunized against critical reexamination? Is there something about civil
rights, or particularly questions of race, that forecloses further inquiry
wherever a claim to an exclusionary right of free association has been
struck down as an unlawful discrimination?
The per curiam decision in Patterson, expressing bemused surprise that
the four dissenters were objecting to the reconsideration, found both Jus-
6. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 108 S. Ct. 1419, 1420 (1988) (citation omitted).
7. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 160.
8. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
9. Id. at 413. Like Runyon, Jones was a seven to two decision written by Justice Stewart.
10. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 186 (Powell, J., concurring).
11. Id. at 189 (Stevens, J., concurring).
12. Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 1422-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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tice Blackmun's and Justice Stevens' dissenting opinions 3 to "intimate
that the statutory question involved in Runyon v. McCrary should not be
subject to the same principles of stare decisis as other decisions because it
benefited civil rights plaintiffs by expanding liability under the statute.' 14
It went on to hold unacceptable "any such exception to the abiding rule
that [the Court] treat all litigants equally ....""
One may suppose that the dissenters would disagree with this charac-
terization of their position. Arguably, their words did not signify simply
a special solicitude for civil rights plaintiffs. What Justice Blackmun, in
dissent, questioned was "the motivation of five Members of this Court to
reconsider an interpretation of a civil rights statute that so clearly reflects
our society's earnest commitment to ending racial discrimination, and in
which Congress so evidently has acquiesced."16 Justice Stevens focused on
the majority's "spontaneous decision" to reconsider Runyon, and opined
that this "will, by itself, have a deleterious effect on the faith reposed by
racial minorities in the continuing stability of a rule of law that guaran-
tees them the 'same right' as 'white citizens.' "17 Both authors could,
and very possibly will, say they were addressing a particular species of
statutory construction in a particular historic context rather than propos-
ing an apparatus of special favor for civil rights plaintiffs.
Whether or not "reconsideration" is a good idea, the four dissenters
touched upon a point of consequence in the argument for following stare
decisis in the ultimate result. Runyon, like Jones before it, is part of a
tidal flow that can be diverted only at the cost of ignoring or depreciating
the greatest single challenge of this century-the effort to continue "abol-
ishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States."'" The
history of betrayal and neglect of that commitment is as familiar as it is
shameful. Moving through and beyond the middle of the twentieth cen-
tury, however, we have advanced meaningfully and without interruption
toward keeping the promise of 1776-to acknowledge the equality of all
people, not excluding descendants of former slaves. That goal has be-
come the most significant matter on our domestic agenda (which is not to
13. Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens each joined the other, and both opinions were joined
by Justices Brennan and Marshall.
14. 108 S. Ct. at 1421. The majority argued that stare decisis is not a "mechanical formula,"
id., and that the dissenters argued for a new, inflexible rule.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1422 (emphasis added).
17. Id. at 1422-23.
18. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
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overlook its vital importance for international relations), and the
Supreme Court has led the march. As Chief Justice Burger proclaimed,
during "the past quarter of a century, every pronouncement of [the
Supreme] Court and myriad Acts of Congress and Executive Orders at-
test a firm national policy to prohibit racial segregation and
discrimination." 19
The idea of a national consensus is centrally relevant. It does not sig-
nify in any crude sense that the Court must respond to the election re-
turns, though a Court that did not know about them would stagger
perilously through the complex world it so profoundly affects. It does
mean that the Court must stay attuned to-must oftentimes lead, as it
has with respect to the problems of racism-the deep moral strivings of
the national community. Stare decisis is not, after all, a technical spe-
cialty to which the citizenry are indifferent. It is rather an acknowledg-
ment of and a promise to fulfill the expectations of stability and order
with which a democratic society invests its judges. It is, as the Court has
said for itself,
the means by which we ensure that the law will not merely change errati-
cally, but will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion. That doctrine
permits society to presume that bedrock principles are founded in the law
rather than in the proclivities of individuals, and thereby contributes to the
integrity of our constitutional system of government, both in appearance
and in fact.20
Thus, when we deal with such "bedrock principles" as those the Court
has marked for the nation on the long way up from slavery, the sugges-
tion that some of the advances may be nullified on the Court's own mo-
tion is understandably received as a shock. This is not because "civil
rights plaintiffs" are to be darlings of the law. It is because the continued
expansion of civil rights is-or should be-the chief business of the
Court in our time.
III.
Moving from the wide setting in which the question of reconsideration
arises, we come to more sharply pointed arguments favoring stare decisis
in the pending case. These arguments are being made in a suit where it is
a statute, not the Constitution, that the Court is expounding. Twenty
19. Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 593 (1983).
20. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986).
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years have passed since Jones and twelve have passed since Runyon held
that sections 1982 and 1981, respectively, apply to private as well as gov-
ernmental discrimination. If that interpretation was "wrong" or disfa-
vored, Congress has had plenary power to change it. Indeed, Congress
has been astute to notice the Court's handling of civil rights statutes and
has acted repeatedly in recent years to overturn decisions that it viewed
as reading the statutes too narrowly or insufficiently favorably to plaintiffs
charging discrimination.21 If one could say nothing more on this score
than that Congress has never acted to change the result in Runyon, this
alone would favor the view that Congress has acquiesced in the interpre-
tation.22  "[C]onsiderations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of
statutory construction, where Congress is free to change [the] Court's
interpretation of its legislation."23
However, there is more on the side of stare decisis than merely the
tacit agreement of Congress. Congress has more than once taken actions
that amount to positive acceptance and ratification of the interpretations
in Runyon and Jones-actions that add special force to the claims of
stare decisis.24 An early occasion of this kind occurred after Jones and
before Runyon, when the Senate rejected a proposal that would have
made Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act the exclusive remedy for
employment discrimination, sweeping 42 U.S.C. section 1981 out of this
21. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95- 555, 92 Stat. 2076, codified at
42 U.SC. § 2000e, overturning General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Voting Rights
Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973, overturn-
ing Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980); Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
259, 102 Stat. 28, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, overturning Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S.
555 (1984); Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796,
codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4)(B)-(G), overturning Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984); cf.
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641, codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1988, overturning Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
22. See, eg., United States v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., 298 U.S. 492, 500 (1936) (Court
concluded judicial interpretation of commodities clause of Interstate Commerce Act had legislative
approval because after a 1915 opinion imputing intent to Congress, Congress made no amendment to
the clause).
23. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977).
24. See Square D Co. v. Nicagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 419-20, 424 (1986)
(Court found "powerful support to continued viability" of judicial interpretation of antitrust laws
applicable to carriers where Congress specifically reexamined that area of the law and left it un-
changed); Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 501-02, 507-08 (1982) (Court's conclusion
that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to § 1983 action had clear
congressional support when, in legislative history to later § 1997e, Congress stated that requiring
exhaustion for certain § 1983 cases would "change the law").
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field. In the debate that led to the rejection of that proposal, Senator
Williams said on the floor:
It was recently stated by the Supreme Court in the case of Jones v. Mayer,
that these acts [including the Civil Rights Act of 1866] provide fundamen-
tal constitutional guarantees. In any case, the courts have specifically held
that Title VII and the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871 are not mutually
exclusive, and must be read together to provide alternative means to redress
individual grievances.
The peculiarly damaging nature of employment discrimination is such that
the individual, who is frequently forced to face a large and powerful em-
ployer, should be accorded every protection that the law has in its purview,
and that the person should not be forced to seek his remedy in only one
place. 25
At a later point in the legislative process the Senator expressed again the
sense of the opposition to altering the Jones interpretation of section 1981
when he said: "For 100 years, there has been built a body of law dealing
with the rights of individuals that would be wiped out. ..."
The House of Representatives receded from a contrary position and
accepted the view of the Senate that it was inappropriate to adopt the
exclusivity proposal and, in effect, to repeal pro tanto the 1866 Civil
Rights Act.27 Of primary importance now is that both Houses, following
Jones and without the benefit of Runyon, assumed that 42 U.S.C. section
1981 applied to private conduct within the field of employment as well as
elsewhere.
A similar indication of Congress' position came with the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976.28 That Act was a response to Aly-
eska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,29 which enforced the
traditional American rule against the award of attorney's fees in the ab-
sence of specific statutory authorization. The Alyeska Court criticized a
series of lower court decisions granting attorneys' fees under various stat-
utes, including the Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 1871 and 1875.30 In what
amounted to a direct response, when Congress "corrected" Aleyska, it
25. 118 CONG. REc. 3371-72 (1972).
26. 118 CONG. REc. 3963 (1972).
27. Conference Report on HR. 1746, The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, H.R.
REP. No. 92-899, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
29. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
30. See 421 U.S. at 270 n.46.
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listed 42 U.S.C. section 1981 among the statutes under which fees could
be awarded in successful attacks upon private employment discrimina-
tion or other forms of invidious treatment of blacks.31
In short, Congress has been fully and approvingly aware of Jones and
Runyon, and has legislated upon the premise that these decisions are part
of the interrelated proscriptions enforcing the national policy against ra-
cial discrimination. To overrule either or both of these decisions would
not merely excise two unconnected "cases." It would distort and unset-
tle a matrix of legal doctrine of which the two cases are vital parts. It
would defeat congressional and wider public understandings that racial
discrimination is illegal in private employment, in private as well as pub-
lic education, and in other social and economic arrangements that take
contractual form.
IV.
One must acknowledge, of course, that the Supreme Court has more
than once overruled decisions interpreting statutes even in the absence of
congressional evidences of disapproval. However, these cases have not
only lacked the kind of congressional approval present here, they have
also occurred where special reasons of social or legal policy, including a
regard for reasonable consistency in the law, warranted or required the
changed interpretation. Expressing broadly the relevance of social policy
(then) Judge Cardozo described circumstances that warrant departure
from stare decisis: "If judges have wofully [sic] misinterpreted the mores
of their day, or if the mores of their day are no longer those of ours, they
ought not to tie, in helpless submission, the hands of their successors.")32
In the present situation "the mores of [our] day" call unmistakably for
adherence to the precedent in question.
One or two specific cases of overruled statutory interpretations are
worth mentioning in order to mark the differences between them and the
case at hand.
In Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770,33 the Court
overruled its earlier decision in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson.34 Sin-
31. See, eg., S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONo. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5908, 5911.
32. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 151-52 (1921) (emphasis in
original).
33. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
34. 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
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clair Refining held that federal courts could not issue injunctions to en-
force contractual no-strike provisions. Developments subsequent to
Sinclair Refining, such as the holdings that federal common law gov-
erned collective bargaining agreements and that cases involving interpre-
tations of collective bargaining agreements could be removed from state
to federal courts, left no-strike clauses wholly unenforceable. Because
that combination of legal rules was at odds with federal labor policy
favoring no-strike agreements, Sinclair Refining was overruled.
In Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York City,35 the
Court overruled the determination in Monroe v. Pape36 that a city could
not be deemed a "person" within 42 U.S.C. section 1983. Explaining
that result, the Court observed that the earlier holding was inconsistent
with decisions both preceding and following it, which had allowed other
governmental bodies, notably school boards, to be sued under section
1983.37
No comparable inconsistencies or conflicting legal policies of any simi-
lar nature are present in the Runyon case.
V.
The order for reargument in Patterson has prompted a considerable
outpouring of amicus briefs. This is not surprising or in itself especially
noteworthy. What may be of some special interest is the character and
identity of the amici. Lined up in support of petitioner (against overrul-
ing) are briefs for:
47 states and the District of Columbia, Guam and the Virgin Islands;
66 senators and 118 congressmen;
the 112 organizations I mentioned earlier;
the American Bar Association;
the New York City Bar Association and New York County Lawyers
Association;
The Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law;
seven distinguished historians, with important bibliographies in Amer-
ican history, and especially in the subjects of slavery, Reconstruction
and civil rights;
35. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
36. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
37. 436 U.S. at 665.
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another group of civil rights organizations and the Houston Bar Asso-
ciation; and
the McCrarys, the ultimately successful plaintiffs in Runyon v.
McCrary.
On respondent's side are briefs for:
The Washington Legal Foundation, eight congressmen, three senators
(Helms, Humphrey and Symms), and two other organizations;
the Equal Employment Advisory Council;
The Center for Civil Rights; and
J. Philip Anderegg, Esq., a member of the Supreme Court's bar.
The lineup for petitioner is the more imposing one in a variety of re-
spects. It is less easy to know whether this includes any respect that
might be supposed to bear on the outcome. Finding myself impelled to
speculate about this, I confess to a certain wariness. A few thoughts,
however, seem to merit sharing in the free spirit of academic inquiry.
My speculation started with the extraordinary collection of forty-seven
states on one brief (with the District of Columbia, Guam, and the Virgin
Islands standing in for the missing three).38 There may have been cases
of comparably large state turnouts; I remember none, but confess to only
shaky memory and random checks as my total research. The number is
in any event impressive. Because the rules for amici call at the outset for
statements of the "interests" of those seeking to befriend the Court, it is
pertinent to note that this corps of Attorneys General is surely qualified
to speak loudly and with some authority to the interests of almost every-
one in the United States. Also pertinent is that one of the refrains under-
lying the hostility to Runyon is the thought that the private rights the
case affirmed expand the arsenals of federal law to the arguable constric-
tion of the states' domain. By firmly supporting Runyon, the briefs for
the states undercut that idea. Still more vividly, the almost unanimous
voices of the Attorneys General attest powerfully to the national policy
consensus that I have mentioned as a significant factor in the case.
Obviously, the Justices of the Supreme Court are not commissioned, or
even free, to count amicus votes, or measure amicus hats, as guides to
decision. It may be delicate or impossible to state how, if at all, a brief
for forty-seven states should or may by its very nature carry weight with
38. The three absentees are Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah. When the brief was being ar-
ranged, Arizona's Attorney General was preoccupied with the proceedings to impeach and remove
his governor. Utah is solidly lodged in a political stance that leans sharply away from civil rights
claimants. New Mexico is harder to explain for anyone who, like me, lacks inside information.
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the Court. Similar thoughts apply to the Senate majority and heavy con-
gressional turnout for preserving Runyon, as well as the long roster of
social, civic and civil rights organizations joined in that position. Still, it
is not possible to imagine that the number and identity of these voices,
even before attending to the specifics of their legal arguments, can be
immaterial to the process of reconsideration on which the Court is
embarked.
Though I end with a subtopic of some uncertainty, I conclude that the
totality of relevant considerations weighs decisively on the side of reaf-
firming Jones and Runyon. Even to approach an opposite result would
require a judgment that the precedents are egregiously and destructively
wrong. To accept such a judgment would call for a kind of intense cer-
tainty that no one is entitled to entertain--certainty about what the
members of Congress had in mind in 1866, certainty that the seven-mem-
ber majorities were dead wrong in 1968 and 1976, and certainty that the
respect the Court owes to a coordinate branch is accorded by thus delet-
ing a segment of the law that the Congress has accepted and built upon
over the years.
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